(Ecofin Agency) - In early March 2025, an IMF team from Washington visited Kinshasa. No official statement was released at the end of the trip, so Bankable reached out to the IMF’s resident representative in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to understand what was discussed.

René Tapsoba has been in this role since October 2024, after spending six years in Mali in the same position. With experience at the West African Development Bank (BOAD), he shared his thoughts on how the growing security crisis is affecting the IMF’s new program in the DRC and how the institution can help a country that may need more foreign currency to fund its military, given the escalating conflict in the East.

Bankable: The IMF team visited the DRC in early March. Since the program was approved on January 15, the country has faced a serious challenge, with fighting intensifying in North and South Kivu. Given this situation, what kind of atmosphere did you find within the Congolese administration?

René Tapsoba: As you said, just two weeks after the IMF approved two new programs, the DRC was hit by a sharp increase in violence in the East. This is a serious setback, and beyond the security implications, it’s a major humanitarian crisis.

Our Managing Director recently met with the Minister of Finance in Washington to express her support, and I want to do the same here. Our thoughts are with everyone affected by this violence. We all hope to see peace and stability return as soon as possible so the country can focus on what really matters—unlocking its full potential and building a stronger, more inclusive economy.

That being said, we were reassured by the government’s determination to keep pushing forward with the two programs, despite the difficult circumstances. The Minister of Finance had already given that commitment in Washington, and during our visit, we saw the same determination across the government’s technical teams.

There’s still a strong focus on stabilizing the economy and moving ahead with reforms, even as the challenges grow. At the same time, our counterparts made it clear that their hearts are with the people in the East, who are facing unimaginable hardship.

Bankable: The authorities have committed to providing around 40 indicators for the Extended Credit Facility and about a dozen for the Resilience and Sustainability Facility. Have you received all the necessary data for the first review?

René Tapsoba: First, it’s important to clarify that while discussions for the formal mission on the first review of the Extended Credit Facility program are tentatively scheduled for April, they will be followed by an internal IMF review process before the file is submitted to the Executive Board, likely in late June or earlier. Only after the Board's approval can a second disbursement under the Extended Credit Facility take place, which won’t happen before the end of June 2025.

As for the Resilience and Sustainability Facility, the first deadline is set for October-November 2025. If the reforms are implemented on time, this could lead to a disbursement of two tranches after the Executive Board’s approval, expected in late December or early January 2026.

Bankable: Have you received the expected data?

René Tapsoba: The technical teams have made every effort to provide the requested data and information. The first measures are already in place to ensure the required reforms are completed on schedule.

For the Resilience and Sustainability Facility, the deadlines are still a bit further out, giving some flexibility. Regarding the Extended Credit Facility, we have received the initial data as expected. However, given the potential macroeconomic and budgetary impact of the worsening security crisis and its humanitarian consequences, additional data will be needed to reassess the macroeconomic framework in light of these new developments.

This work will be crucial in preparing for the formal mission on the first program review, planned for around April. In short, we have all the data that was initially requested, but the evolving situation requires additional information to refine our analysis of its macroeconomic and budgetary implications.

Bankable: Does this mean the program will be reassessed before the first review?

René Tapsoba: No, this isn’t a reassessment of the program itself it’s a reevaluation of the potential macroeconomic impact, given that we’re dealing with a shock. When something like this happens, we need to analyze its effects on several areas, including the real economy (growth, inflation), the balance of payments, and public finance management.

We also have to look at the measures taken by the authorities to soften the impact and determine which effects are beyond their control. Some consequences simply can’t be offset by policy actions, no matter what steps are taken internally. That’s why a thorough analysis is crucial. We’re continuing discussions with the authorities and have requested additional data to refine our understanding of the situation.

Bankable: Did the crisis in the East cause a delay in the second disbursement, which was expected in May but is now pushed to June?

René Tapsoba: So, the disbursement happening after June has nothing to do with the security crisis. This is just the normal timeline. The mission usually takes place in late April or early May. Once discussions wrap up, and if everything goes well, a preliminary staff-level agreement is typically announced in mid-May. But that announcement doesn’t mean an immediate disbursement. The process still has to go through internal reviews before being submitted to the Executive Board, which usually happens in late June, sometimes even early July. So, the timing is not related to the security situation.

Bankable: Many wonder how the IMF evaluates a program and decides whether to proceed with a disbursement or suspend it. Can you explain how this process works?

René Tapsoba: Performance is assessed based on several factors. First, there are quantitative criteria. In the case of the DRC, this includes things like the central bank’s commitments and limits on the government’s external borrowing.

Then, we evaluate progress on structural reforms, especially those focused on modernizing public finance management. For this program, that includes adherence to the spending chain, reducing emergency spending procedures, and making the General Treasury Directorate fully operational, among other measures.

We also consider indicative targets. While these don’t carry the same legal weight as quantitative criteria or structural benchmarks, they’re still important. For instance, in the DRC, we look at minimum spending levels for key budget priorities, particularly in social sectors like healthcare, social protection, and humanitarian aid. The goal is to ensure that the IMF-supported program adequately protects the country’s most vulnerable populations.

Bankable: Are shocks like the war in the East taken into account in this evaluation?

René Tapsoba: Let’s be clear here. We’re not robots at the IMF. We take a close look at performance gaps caused by external shocks that are completely beyond the government’s control.

Our role is to distinguish between what can be addressed with corrective measures and what goes beyond their ability to manage. That’s exactly why we’ve requested additional data to refine our analysis and get a clearer picture of the situation.

Bankable: IMF resources are usually used to cover a country’s ability to meet its international financial obligations. How do these funds fit into the country’s budget and economy?

René Tapsoba: Under the previous program supported by the Extended Credit Facility, disbursed funds were strictly for balance of payments support. As you pointed out, they were used to strengthen the central bank’s international reserves, ensuring the country could meet its external financial commitments and improve its resilience to external shocks.

However, under the new program approved by the Executive Board in January—at the request of the Congolese authorities—it was agreed that part of the disbursements could be allocated to the state budget.

That said, this budgetary allocation is conditional on real progress in modernizing public finance management. If these improvements are observed in the coming months, then in addition to boosting international reserves, a portion of the disbursements could also be directed toward the state budget.

Bankable: The next disbursement is estimated at 190.4 million Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), or just over $266.6 million. Given the worsening security situation in the east, which is driving up military spending in foreign currency, is there a chance the IMF will approve a larger disbursement after the first review?

René Tapsoba: We are still assessing the budgetary impact of the security crisis. Once our analysis is sufficiently advanced, we will be able to discuss the potential implications for the program’s framework, including financing assumptions, within the IMF.

Our assessment will depend on the mitigation measures planned by the authorities and the financial support that can be mobilized from other development partners. In these situations, we follow what we call a fair burden-sharing approach. This means that when additional financing needs arise due to an external shock, the IMF cannot be the sole provider of support.

Other partners, such as the World Bank and bilateral donors, are also expected to contribute, while the government is encouraged to implement internal adjustment measures. Only after we have a clear picture of these additional resources and internal efforts can the IMF consider a potential reassessment of its financial support. That’s where things stand for now.

Bankable: During a Cabinet meeting, the government mentioned plans to discuss with the IMF the possibility of using part of the funds made available to finance social spending for military personnel on the front lines in the east of the country. Have you received such a request from the authorities? And if this request was made, do you think the IMF could accept it?

René Tapsoba: In all countries, our approach does not focus on the specific allocation of resources to a particular line item in the budget. Our discussions center on the overall macroeconomic framework, budget balance, and the financing arrangements for any potential deficits.

During last week's mission, the authorities did not specifically raise the issue of funding social support for the security forces. However, they did mention certain budgetary measures they are considering, including those you refer to.

At the IMF, we do not provide funding for specific projects, unlike some other development partners. Our interventions take the form of general budget support or assistance to international reserves. The resources allocated are integrated into the state budget, which gives the government flexibility in their use.

That’s why, in our discussions with the authorities, we analyze the overall budgetary impact and ensure that the implementation of the 2025 budget takes into account these new challenges.

Bankable: Mr. Tapsoba, should we understand that once the IMF provides budget support, the Congolese authorities have full discretion over these funds and can use them according to their own priorities?

René Tapsoba: Exactly, that’s what I was trying to explain earlier. During our missions, we assess financing needs. If an agreement is reached to allocate part of the IMF’s support to the budget, then these resources become fungible within the public treasury. This means that the government can use them in the execution of its budget, based on the priorities it has set in advance. However, these priorities would have been discussed with the IMF within the program framework.

Bankable: Is this what happened with the 145 Territorial Development Program (PDL 145)?

René Tapsoba: The disbursements under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) program were not used to finance the PDL 145. If you remember, in 2021, the IMF allocated SDRs exceptionally to all member countries to help them cope with the impact of COVID-19. In this context, the DRC received $1.5 billion in SDRs.

It was agreed that half of this allocation would be used to strengthen the central bank’s international reserves, while the other half would be allocated to the budget, given the country’s financial difficulties at the time.

It was the government, in full sovereignty, that decided to allocate $511 million of this second tranche to finance the PDL 145. So, to be clear: the resources from the previous ECF program were not used to finance the PDL 145. The confusion probably arises from the fact that the amount of the previous program was similar to that of the exceptional SDR allocation.

Bankable: More than 90% of bank deposits in the DRC are held in US dollars, despite efforts by the central bank and authorities to de-dollarize the economy. How does the IMF program take this situation into account?

René Tapsoba: Dollarization is a process that cannot be decreed but must be built gradually. The key to success lies in restoring the confidence of economic agents in the national currency.

International experience shows that this is a long-term process, with the backbone being the sustained anchoring of economic policy credibility. The programs supported by the IMF, whether the previous program or the current one with the Extended Credit Facility, aim to lay solid foundations to strengthen macroeconomic stability. This involves improving the credibility of monetary and fiscal policies, better alignment between monetary and fiscal policy, as well as economic diversification.

Coordination among these various policies is essential to restoring confidence in the national currency. The strategy of the Congolese authorities fits within this framework. However, as with any de-dollarization process, time, patience, and consistent implementation of reforms are required. Once these prerequisites are firmly in place, dollarization can gradually be reduced as the credibility of the national currency is established.

The key words here are: credibility, trust, patience, and perseverance. Without these, any attempt at de-dollarization is likely to be counterproductive. With the ongoing reforms and the support of the IMF, the Congolese authorities are moving in the right direction to lay the solid foundations necessary for the sustainable reduction of dollarization.

Interview by Idriss Linge and Aboudi Ottou.

Bankable, an economic and financial media outlet based in Kinshasa, is operated by the Ecofin Agency.